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Abstract
Global governance rests on the exercise of public authority by a myriad of actors. In the in-
ternational order, the more powers and influence these actors acquire, the more their legitimacy
proves to be controversial. It is submitted here that the legitimacy of international, regional, and
domestic actors that partake in global governance—those considered here as global actors—must
be appraised from a two-fold standpoint. Their legitimacy can first be gauged through the lens
of the origin of their powers. This is what this Article calls the legitimacy of origin. The origin
of the power may often prove an insufficient indicator of an actor’s legitimacy. For this reason,
legitimacy is also evaluated in light of the way in which the actor exercises its power. This is what
this Article calls the legitimacy of exercise. This Article is based on the assumption that failing to
recognize this dual character of legitimacy of actors involved in global and regional governance
can undermine any endeavor to grasp the contemporary complexity of the latter. The legitimacy
of global actors is primarily a question about how, when exercising public authority, this actor is
perceived as having a “right to rule.” In that sense, there is no doubt that the question of legitimacy
of global actors exercising public authority is, to a large extent, a moral question. Yet, this Article
does not seek to examine the moral criteria through which the legitimacy of actors exercising pub-
lic authority on the international plane ought to be established. This has artfully been endeavored
elsewhere. This Article is—more modestly—concerned with the distinction between different
faces of legitimacy that should arguably be taken into account when making a (moral) evaluation,
as well as how the importance of these various dimensions of legitimacy have been fluctuating in
practice. It thus attempts to unearth the multiple faces of legitimacy and the evolutions thereof,
irrespective of the moral criteria which could eventually be used in each case. Another important
preliminary caveat must be formulated. It cannot be denied that the legitimacy of an authority
classically impinges on the extent to which the rules it prescribes are deemed legitimate. The le-
gitimacy of such rules will not only bear upon the authority and the degree of compliance with
the rule, but it also impacts the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, which in turns affects
its viability.7 This Article, however,while not ignoring that the legitimacy of the actors affects
the legitimacy of the rules and of the system, is not concerned with either of these two questions
and solely concentrates on the legitimacy of international actors. Yet, it will be shown that the
legitimacy of exercise, because it requires an examination of how public authority is exercised,
cannot always be severed from the question of legitimacy of rules. After sketching some of the
contemporary features of legitimacy in international law in Part I, this Article focuses on the ex-
tent to which the so-called principle of democratic legitimacy has impinged on how legitimacy
of global actors is conceived today in Part II. In Part III, this Article then turns to assessing how,
against that backdrop, legitimacy of global actors is evaluated in contemporary practice. Although
not ignoring that the question of legitimacy may arise in connection with other actors, this Article
focuses on two public global actors in particular, namely governments and international organi-
zations,8 with a view to demonstrating that the appraisal of the legitimacy of governments differs
from the legitimacy of international organizations. This Article argues that while the legitimacy
of origin has constituted the classical measure to evaluate the legitimacy of governments, recent
practice has shifted the paradigm toward the legitimacy of exercise. This Article also submits that
the exact opposite paradigm shift is simultaneously taking place in the context of the legitimacy
of international organizations, for the legitimacy of international organizations is incrementally
reviewed from the vantage point of the legitimacy of origin, despite having classically been based
on the legitimacy of exercise.
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THE COMPLEMENTARY FACES OF LEGITIMACY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGITIMACY OF 
ORIGIN AND THE LEGITIMACY OF EXERCISE 
Jean d’Aspremont * and Eric De Brabandere ** 
INTRODUCTION 
Global governance rests on the exercise of public authority 
by a myriad of actors. In the international order, the more 
powers and influence these actors acquire, the more their 
legitimacy proves to be controversial. It is submitted here that the 
legitimacy of international, regional, and domestic actors that 
partake in global governance—those considered here as global 
actors—must be appraised from a two-fold standpoint. Their 
legitimacy can first be gauged through the lens of the origin of 
their powers. This is what this Article calls the legitimacy of origin. 
The origin of the power may often prove an insufficient indicator 
of an actor’s legitimacy. For this reason, legitimacy is also 
evaluated in light of the way in which the actor exercises its power. 
This is what this Article calls the legitimacy of exercise. This Article 
is based on the assumption that failing to recognize this dual 
character of legitimacy of actors involved in global and regional 
governance can undermine any endeavor to grasp the 
contemporary complexity of the latter. 
The legitimacy of global actors is primarily a question about 
how, when exercising public authority, this actor is perceived as 
having a “right to rule.”1 In that sense, there is no doubt that the 
question of legitimacy of global actors exercising public authority 
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of Amsterdam. This Article is an extended version of a book chapter entitled The Duality 
of Legitimacy of Global Actors in the International Legal Order in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A 
MULTIPOLAR WORLD (Matthew Happold ed., forthcoming 2011). 
**  Assistant Professor and Senior Lecturer, Grotius Centre for International Legal 
Studies, University of Leiden. 
1. See Allen Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2009); John Tasioulas, 
The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, supra. 
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is, to a large extent, a moral question.2 Yet, this Article does not 
seek to examine the moral criteria through which the legitimacy 
of actors exercising public authority on the international plane 
ought to be established. This has artfully been endeavored 
elsewhere.3 This Article is—more modestly—concerned with the 
distinction between different faces of legitimacy that should 
arguably be taken into account when making a (moral) 
evaluation, as well as how the importance of these various 
dimensions of legitimacy have been fluctuating in practice. It 
thus attempts to unearth the multiple faces of legitimacy and the 
evolutions thereof, irrespective of the moral criteria which could 
eventually be used in each case. 
Another important preliminary caveat must be formulated. 
It cannot be denied that the legitimacy of an authority classically 
impinges on the extent to which the rules it prescribes are 
deemed legitimate.4 The legitimacy of such rules will not only 
bear upon the authority and the degree of compliance with the 
rule,5 but it also impacts the legitimacy of the legal system as a 
whole,6 which in turns affects its viability.7 This Article, however, 
while not ignoring that the legitimacy of the actors affects the 
legitimacy of the rules and of the system, is not concerned with 
either of these two questions and solely concentrates on the 
legitimacy of international actors. Yet, it will be shown that the 
legitimacy of exercise, because it requires an examination of how 
 
2. See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 80; Thomas Christiano, Democratic Legitimacy and 
International Institutions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, supra note 1; 
Philip Pettit, Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-Republican Perspective, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, supra note 1. 
3. See supra note 1. 
4. See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 80. 
5. The question of the legitimacy of a rule classically relates to the reasons why 
rules are obeyed. It accordingly touches on the theories of compliance. See THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 204–07 (1990); Thomas M. 
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1988); Ian Hurd, 
Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–408 (1999). See 
generally Claire K. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
101 (2005). For a critical approach to the concept of compliance, see generally Benedict 
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International 
Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998). 
6. For a moral evaluation of the legitimacy of international law as a whole, see 
generally ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
7. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193–200 (2d ed. 1997) (viewing “the 
minimal content of natural law” as a condition of viability for the system). 
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public authority is exercised, cannot always be severed from the 
question of legitimacy of rules. 
After sketching some of the contemporary features of 
legitimacy in international law in Part I, this Article focuses on 
the extent to which the so-called principle of democratic 
legitimacy has impinged on how legitimacy of global actors is 
conceived today in Part II. In Part III, this Article then turns to 
assessing how, against that backdrop, legitimacy of global actors 
is evaluated in contemporary practice. Although not ignoring 
that the question of legitimacy may arise in connection with 
other actors, this Article focuses on two public global actors in 
particular, namely governments and international organizations,8 
with a view to demonstrating that the appraisal of the legitimacy 
of governments differs from the legitimacy of international 
organizations. This Article argues that while the legitimacy of 
origin has constituted the classical measure to evaluate the 
legitimacy of governments, recent practice has shifted the 
paradigm toward the legitimacy of exercise. This Article also 
submits that the exact opposite paradigm shift is simultaneously 
taking place in the context of the legitimacy of international 
organizations, for the legitimacy of international organizations is 
incrementally reviewed from the vantage point of the legitimacy 
of origin, despite having classically been based on the legitimacy 
of exercise. 
I. LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
As has been indicated, this Article draws on a distinction 
between the legitimacy of exercise and the legitimacy of origin. 
This dichotomy points to a distinction between the legitimacy 
pertaining to the source of power and the legitimacy related to the 
exercise of power.9 The division between these two dimensions of 
legitimacy has been part of the legal and political discourse for 
 
8. This Article uses the term “international organization” as it is classically 
understood in international legal scholarship: intergovernmental associations of States, 
commonly created by treaty. As such, the term includes intergovernmental and 
supranational organizations. 
9. Though not addressing the issue of legitimacy, Friedrich A. Hayek offers a good 
explanation for the distinction between the exercise of power and the source of power. 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 71 (1976). 
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several years10 although the terminology has varied. Some have 
used the terms “original legitimacy” and “legitimacy of conduct 
or exercise,”11 while others have preferred “instant legitimacy” 
and “continual legitimacy,”12 or have used the similar notions of 
“representative democracy” and “participatory democracy.”13 
This Article uses the terms “legitimacy of origin” and “legitimacy 
of exercise.”14 
The distinction between the legitimacy of origin and the 
legitimacy of exercise has classically been explored against the 
backdrop of the legitimacy of a government. In this particular 
context, the legitimacy of origin is a tool to assess the manner in 
which a government comes to power (e.g., coup, dynasty, 
election), while the legitimacy of exercise permits evaluation of 
the way in which the government exerts its power. It is the 
intention of this Article to also examine how this dichotomy 
applies to actors other than governments and, in particular, 
international organizations. 
It is important to note here that, in the context of the 
legitimacy of governments, the distinction between legitimacy of 
origin and legitimacy of exercise only concerns the external—and 
not the internal—legitimacy of a government. The legitimacy of a 
government can be measured from two different standpoints. 
One can assess its internal legitimacy—how it is perceived by the 
people subject to it—and its external legitimacy—how it is perceived 
by other international authorities.15 The internal legitimacy of an 
 
10. Organization of American States, Meeting the Political Priorities of the Organization 
of American States, O.A.S.T.S. Doc. No. CP/doc.4071/05, at 3 (Dec. 14, 2005) (“The 
Secretariat will continue to work to ensure the legitimacy of origin of governments 
(electoral observation, etc.) but will broaden its work to assist with the legitimacy of 
exercise of government (governance).”). 
11. See Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 
7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 261, 261–328 (2003). 
12. See, e.g., Vesna Pusić, Democracy Versus Nation: Dictatorships with Democratic 
Legitimacy, 5 HELSINKI MONITOR 69, 80 (1994). 
13. On the notion of participatory democracy in the context of post-conflict peace-
building, see generally Jarat Chopra & Tanja Hohe, Participatory Intervention, 10 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 289 (2004). 
14. This distinction has been used by Jean d’Aspremont in Legitimacy of Governments 
in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 877, 894 (2006). 
15. The distinction between internal and external legitimacy only relates to the 
position of the observer. It does not have any bearing upon the measures that are used 
to carry out the test of legitimacy. This means that external legitimacy can focus on the 
respect for the rights of the individual but as seen through the lens of foreign 
governments. 
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authority is usually related to the achievement of social and 
distributive justice,16 and thus revolves around the existence of a 
government for the people.17 It is this type of legitimacy that, as 
Weber famously explained in another context, enhances the 
stability of an authority and secures obedience.18 The internal 
legitimacy is, however, of little relevance to the appraisal of 
government, especially from the standpoint of international law. 
Indeed, international law is only concerned with the way in which 
a government’s legitimacy is perceived by other international 
authorities. In that sense, the application of international law is 
not directly contingent upon the perception of the people, 
although it cannot be denied that the internal legitimacy of a 
given authority affects the way other actors assess the external 
legitimacy of that authority.19 
The distinction between internal and external legitimacy has 
classically been less relevant in the context of international 
organizations. Strictly speaking, there is no subject-sovereign 
relationship between individuals and international organizations. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that more recently some 
international organizations have embarked on missions that 
include the administration of territories, in which case 
individuals within those territories are subject to the authority of 
the intergovernmental organization.20 Other international 
organizations, like the European Union (“EU”), are endowed 
 
16. On the relationship between justice and democracy, see generally IAN SHAPIRO, 
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999). 
17. This has been called “output legitimacy” as opposed to “input legitimacy” (i.e., 
a government by the people). For such a distinction, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy and 
the Multi-Actor Polity, in ORGANIZING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: ESSAYS FOR JOHAN P. 
OLSEN 268 (Morton Egeberg & Per Lægreid eds., 1999). 
18. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 31 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
1968); see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 200–01 
(1832); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 46, 48 (1992); Robert Grafstein, The Legitimacy of Political Institutions, 14 POLITY 51, 51 
(1981). 
19. See the criterion of “representativity” (the degree to which a government 
represents its people) that is often resorted to in the recognition policy of states. On this 
question, see Stefan Talmon, Who Is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative 
Criteria for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law, in THE REALITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 509–17 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill 
& Stefan Talmon eds., 1999). 
20. See generally ERIC DE BRABANDERE, POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL 
AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2009). 
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with sweeping powers that directly affect the lives of people. This 
means that there are an increasing number of instances where 
the legitimacy of international organizations can be construed 
from an internal perspective as well. 
A remark must also be formulated about when and how 
legitimacy of global actors is generally tested. In this respect, it 
should be briefly emphasized that governmental legitimacy is not 
constantly under scrutiny in the international legal order. 
Legitimacy is only intermittently tested. This is well illustrated by 
the question of legitimacy of governments. Even if much 
attention is often paid to the form of governments in the 
international arena, the assessment of their legitimacy is not 
systematic. The mere measurement of the democratic character 
of government does not necessarily involve an evaluation—which 
is very common in international relations—of its legitimacy.21 
The question of legitimacy only arises when there is a need to 
determine the authority entrusted with the power to act and 
speak on behalf of the state. Such a determination is only 
required in limited, but significant, situations. The authority that 
can speak and act on behalf of the state in the international legal 
order must be determined ahead of any recognition of 
government, when accreditation within international 
organizations is sought by two warring governments, or when a 
state invites another state to carry out a military operation on its 
 
21. This is well illustrated by international economic relations that are the most 
common leverage for various sorts of policies. These relations are often conditioned 
upon compliance with democratic principles. The suspension or the severance of 
economic relations following a breach of democracy is not tantamount to a judgment 
about legitimacy. Indeed, the government barred from cooperating with another 
because of its nondemocratic character is not necessarily seen as illegitimate by the 
former. On US international economic policy, see generally HOSSEIN G. ASKARI ET AL., 
CASE STUDIES OF U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE CHINESE, CUBAN, AND IRANIAN 
EXPERIENCE (2003); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE (1990); 
ZACHARY SELDEN, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
(1999). Regarding the international financial relations, see BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK (1992). On the 
importance of democracy in the European international economic relations, see the 
Cotonou Agreement between the European Community and the African, Carribean, 
and Pacific (“ACP”) Countries signed on June 23, 2000 and concluded for a twenty-year 
period from March 2000 to February 2020. Partnership Agreement between the 
Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the 
European Community and Its Member States, on the Other Part, June 23, 2000, O.J. L 
317 (2000). 
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own territory. The tests of legitimacy applied in each of these 
contexts have usually been centered on the legitimacy of origin.22 
In the case of international organizations, occasions where 
their legitimacy has been tested have, until recently, remained 
rather scarce. This may happen when states are confronted with 
the growing powers of international organizations, for instance, 
on the basis of the implied powers doctrine.23 Likewise, the 
question of the legitimacy of international organizations may 
arise when, in the context of a reform of the constitutive treaty of 
the organizations concerned, the endowment of more powers to 
the organization is envisaged. The same is true when states 
consider terminating the organization or withdrawing from it. In 
recent years, the greater involvement of international 
organizations in the reconstruction and administration of states 
in the aftermath of conflicts has, however, offered new instances 
where the legitimacy of international organizations has been 
tested.24 Indeed, the question of the legitimacy of these 
international organizations has been raised since on these 
occasions they have been endowed with wide-ranging powers 
bearing inevitable resemblance to sovereign power over 
individuals. The last part of this Article is especially devoted to 
the question of legitimacy of international organizations in the 
context of post-conflict administrations. 
A word must also be said about the historical relevance of the 
distinction between the legitimacy of exercise and the legitimacy 
of origin. While it only has been recently systematized, the 
distinction between legitimacy of exercise and origin helps one 
understand the practice even at a time when there were no 
international organizations and international relations were 
exclusively within the hands of states. It is true that the legitimacy 
of origin was the dominant criterion, at least so long as the 
legitimacy of a government hinged on its dynastic origin.25 
 
22. For an analysis of these cases where legitimacy of government is tested, see 
d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 877–918. 
23. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
24. On the contemporary practice of international administration of territories, see 
DE BRABANDERE, supra note 20. 
25. This entailed that only dynastic authorities were recognized. See Gregory H. 
Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 48, 49 
(1992). 
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Following the ideas developed by Locke26 and Rousseau27 that 
were later magnified by the American and French Revolutions, 
legitimacy came to be linked to “the will of the people.”28 As 
Roth explains, even before the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, “almost all states—whether liberal democracies, 
one-party revolutionary states, military dictatorships, or 
traditionalist regimes—subscribed to the notion that ‘the will of 
the people’ constitutes the ultimate source of governmental 
legitimacy.”29 In that sense, a government was deemed legitimate 
if it could be said to be a government “by the people,”30 a 
criterion that, again, hints at the origin of the authority. But the 
early practice of international relations is also pervaded by cases 
where legitimacy was assessed through the lens of the exercise of 
power, as illustrated by the continuous importance of the 
effectiveness of the authority.31 The history of international 
relations has thus witnessed the recourse to both the legitimacy 
of origin and the legitimacy of exercise. The end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of democracy as the only acceptable model of 
domestic governance have revived the relevance of this 
distinction. This point is further discussed in the following 
section. 
II. LEGITIMACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 
There is little doubt that the end of the Cold War and the 
sweeping fallout of that event on the international plane have 
impinged significantly on international law and the manner in 
that legitimacy is perceived in the international legal order. 
 
26. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (J. M. Dent & Sons 1962) 
(1690). 
27. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., 
Penguin Books 1968) (1762). 
28. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and the 
American Bill Of Rights: A Bicentennial Commemoration. S. DOC. NO. 101–09 (1989); 
FRIEDRICH GENTZ, THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS COMPARED (John Quincy 
Adams trans., Henry Regnery Company 1955) (1800). 
29. BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 
(2000). 
30. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Admantios Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), reprinted in 
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 318–19 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859) (emphasis 
added). 
31. This means that only effective governments are recognized. See P.K. MENON, 
THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–68 (1994). For a discussion of the 
different “vehicles of legitimation,” see ROTH, supra note 29, at 41–51. 
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Indeed, the demise of communist regimes put an end to the 
ideological division that had gripped the world for nearly fifty 
years. This has unmistakably caused remarkable changes in 
international society, however short-lived they may be. In 
particular, the idea that democracy is the only acceptable type of 
regime has gained broad support, even monopolizing the 
political discourse32 (despite a lingering disagreement about its 
accurate meaning33). It is accordingly no surprise that 
international law and its rules pertaining to the legitimacy of 
governments have been deeply affected by the rise of democracy 
as the only acceptable model of governance at the domestic level. 
Before spelling out the precise consequences of the emergence 
of a consensus about democracy on the legitimacy of global 
actors itself, it is necessary to briefly take stock of the state of 
international law pertaining to democratic governance. 
A. Democracy in International Law 
International legal scholars promptly recognized that the 
post-Cold War international legal order had become more 
amenable to the prominent role of democracy. American liberal 
scholars, in particular, have enthusiastically supported the idea 
that democracy today plays a crucial role in the international 
legal order and have swiftly provided various optimistic accounts 
of the extent of the legal changes brought about by democracy.34 
French positivist lawyers, although they have usually voiced 
greater skepticism and refrained from embracing the whole array 
of consequences that liberals attached to a lack of democracy, 
 
32. See generally SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS 30–49 (2000); 
see also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and 
its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1–4 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). 
33. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 6 (1987). But see 
Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization and 
International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 889–90 (2004). 
34. The most radical liberal view on this question is probably offered by Fernando 
R. Tesón in The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 54–55 (1992). 
For milder forms of the democratic entitlement theory, see Christina M. Cerna, 
Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 289, 329 (1995); Franck, supra note 18, 47–48. For an overview of how 
participatory rights emerged in international law, see Fox, supra note 25, at 10–33. For a 
basic account of the arguments for and against the democratic entitlement theory, see 
generally Fox & Roth, supra note 32. 
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have also recognized that democracy can play a role in the 
international legal order.35 Even if one does not agree with all 
the legal consequences that American scholars have associated 
with the emergence of democracy in the international legal 
order,36 it is reasonable to contend that living up to some 
democratic standards corresponds with an international 
customary obligation. Indeed, contemporary practice shows that, 
to a large degree, states consider the adoption of the main 
characteristics of a democratic regime to amount to an 
international obligation and act accordingly toward 
nondemocratic states.37 It is of particular relevance that many 
nondemocratic states do not oppose the principle of democracy, 
and even claim that they are themselves in the midst of progress 
toward the establishment of democracy.38 In that sense, 
nondemocratic states, with a view to strengthening the legitimacy 
of their government, try to portray their political regime in a 
democratic fashion rather than choosing to dispute the role that 
democracy plays in the international order. 
Nonetheless, this customary legal obligation to adopt a 
democratic regime must not be exaggerated—such overreaching 
is where the aforementioned liberal theories about democracy 
prove unconvincing.39 First, the scope of ratione materiae of the 
 
35. See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, L’ETAT NON DEMOCRATIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL. 
ETUDE CRITIQUE DU DROIT POSITIF ET DE LA PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINE [THE NON-
DEMOCRATIC STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. CRITICAL STUDY OF POSITIVE LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE] 263–93 (2008). For earlier analyses, see LINOS-ALEXANDRE 
SICILIANOS, L’O.N.U. ET LA DEMOCRATISATION DE L’ETAT: SYSTEMES REGIONAUX ET 
ORDRE JURIDIQUE UNIVERSEL [THE U.N. AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE STATE: 
REGIONAL SYSTEMS AND UNIVERSAL LEGAL ORDER] 31 (2000); Pierre Klein, Le droit aux 
élections libres en droit international: Mythes et réalités [The Right to Free Elections in 
International Law: Myths and Realities], in LA RECHERCHE DU NOUVEL ORDRE MONDIAL 
[THE SEARCH FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER] 93, 95–98 (Olivier Corten et al. eds., 1993). 
36. For one criticism of the liberal theories of democracy, see D’ASPREMONT, supra 
note 35. 
37. See id. 
38. For one example, consider the recent events in Pakistan. In particular, see 
Carlotta Gall et al., Rebuffing U.S., Musharraf Calls Crackdown Crucial to a Fair Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1 (interviewing President Musharraf). Musharraf has since 
stepped down from military leadership. See, e.g., David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, In 
Musharraf’s Shadow, a New Hope for Pakistan Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A3. Also 
relevant are the developments in Myanmar. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Myanmar Claims Step 
to Democracy, but Junta Still Grips to Power, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 4, 2007, at N3. See 
also LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 8–9 (1999). 
39. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 35. 
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principle of democracy in international law is limited, as the 
obligation rests on only an electoral and procedural understanding 
of democracy.40 States are customarily obliged to abide by 
democracy to the sole extent that their effective leaders (or the 
parliamentary body that oversees their executive mandate) are 
chosen through free and fair elections.41 Likewise, this customary 
obligation, while being erga omnes,42 is certainly not of a jus cogens 
character, as it is underscored by the existence of numerous 
persistent objectors to that customary rule.43 
It would also be a mistake to consider the obligation to be 
democratic utterly groundbreaking. The development of a 
customary norm in this area is unsurprising, given that 
international law has long regulated some aspects of states’ 
political regimes. Through human rights law, the international 
community has regulated the way in which power is exercised 
and has prohibited some types of political regimes—for example, 
apartheid44 and, to a lesser extent, fascism.45 Moreover, the 
obligation to organize free and fair elections is not entirely new 
in the international legal order, as a similar obligation is already 
embedded in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
 
40. See Fox, supra note 25. For criticism of this “minimalistic” understanding of 
democracy, see DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 8–9; Barry Gills et al., Low Intensity Democracy, 
in LOW INTENSITY DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3, 21 
(Barry Gills et al. eds., 1993); J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMORATIC POLITICAL THEORY 3–15 
(1979); Richard Burchill, Book Review, The Developing International Law of Democracy, 64 
MOD. L. REV. 123, 128 (2001) (reviewing Fox and Roth’s Democratic Governance and 
International Law); Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise 
of Democracy, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 601, 603–05 (2003). 
41. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 35, at 15. 
42. Id. at 291. 
43. The People’s Republic of China and several states in the Middle East can 
probably be considered persistent objectors to that rule. See, e.g., ZHANG LIANG, THE 
TIANANMEN PAPERS (Andrew J. Nathan & Perry Link eds., 2001). 
44. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid, July 18, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. III, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 
195. For UN resolutions condemning apartheid, see S.C. Res. 288, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/288 (Nov. 17, 1970); S.C. Res. 277, U.N. Doc. S/RES/277 (Mar. 18, 1970); S.C. 
Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968); S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 
(Apr. 9, 1966); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966); S.C. Res. 216, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/216 (Nov. 12, 1965); S.C. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 12, 1965); 
G.A. Res. 1791, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1791 (Dec. 11, 1962); G.A. Res. 1598, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1598 (Apr. 13, 1961). 
45. See G.A. Res. 36/162, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/162 (Dec. 16, 1981). 
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Rights (“ICCPR”),46 which has been ratified by 161 states.47 It 
must be pointed out, however, that even if the international legal 
order enshrines a principle of procedural democracy applicable to 
the political regime of states, there is no corresponding 
requirement of democracy applicable to the structure and 
functioning of the international legal system as a whole. This is 
not totally astonishing, given the inapplicability of the classical 
domestic blueprints of governance to the international system.48 
Despite its limited ambit, democracy has borne observable 
legal consequences. This is especially true in connection with the 
ability of states to take countermeasures to sanction violations of 
democracy. Indeed, notwithstanding the safeguarding clause 
adopted by the International Law Commission,49 there is a fair 
amount of practice as well as scholarship buttressing the idea 
that, in the case of the violation of democracy, all states—or at 
least those states party to the ICCPR, when the obligation only 
arises under that treaty—are entitled to take countermeasures 
against the offending state.50 Given the dramatic impact such 
sanctions may have, one should not underestimate the 
importance of such a remedy. 
B. Democratic Legitimacy of Global Public Actors 
Because rules pertaining to democracy in international law 
are restricted to domestic governance, their impact is 
 
46. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 95-29 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See generally Andreas 
Mavrommatis, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Role in 
Promoting Democracy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 255 
(Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2000). 
47. See Katie Lee, China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Prospects and Challenges, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 445 (2007) (on the possible ratification of 
the ICCPR by the People’s Republic of China); Office for U.N. Comm’r for Human 
Rights, Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (July 
14, 2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/status.pdf; see also James C. 
McKinley Jr., Cuba Signs Two Treaties on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A6. 
48. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law: Governance, 
Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 547 (2004). 
49. See G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2001). 
50. See U.N. Int’l. Law Comm’n, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, 137–39 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Report] (discussing practices mentioned by 
the special rapporteur in its commentary on Article 54); see also Christian J. Tams, 
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 220–21 (2005); sources cited 
supra note 35. 
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unsurprisingly almost exclusively limited to the legitimacy of 
governments. Their application to the legitimacy of international 
organizations is less evident given that rules pertaining to 
domestic governance cannot always easily be transposed as such 
at the level of international organizations. Eventually, it must be 
acknowledged that international organizations are not subjected 
to the international obligations to abide by some procedural 
form of democracy in organizing free and fair elections. This is 
why this Part only deals with the democratic legitimacy of 
governments. That does not mean, however, that democratic 
legitimacy is of no relevance at all in the case of international 
organizations. As will be argued in Part III.B, criteria pertaining 
to the legitimacy of origin is no longer entirely alien to the 
assessment of the legitimacy of international organizations. For 
the time being, however, this section only deals with the 
democratic legitimacy of governments. 
In the case of the legitimacy of governments, it is important 
to realize that, while possibly constituting a customary 
international legal obligation, the breach of which triggers the 
legal consequences described above, democracy has 
simultaneously become a fundamental criterion for the 
legitimization of governments in the sense that, today, a new 
government hardly qualifies as the legitimate representative of a 
state if it has not been democratically elected.51 This formidable 
development is not a consequence of the abovementioned 
obligation to have democratic institutions, but rests on the 
discretion of states to choose whether to recognize a new 
government. There is indeed no such obligation not to recognize 
nondemocratic governments. As mentioned above, the 
obligation to be democratic does not constitute a jus cogens norm. 
Even if it were a jus cogens norm, it is not certain that a state, in 
recognizing a nondemocratic government, would also recognize 
as legal the violation of the obligation to be democratic.52 
Even though this does not correspond to any legal 
obligation, it seems uncontested that, since the end of the Cold 
War, the (external) legitimacy of an authority has come to 
 
51. See d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 887–88. 
52. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 35, at 151. 
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depend almost entirely upon its democratic character.53 The idea 
of a government based on the will of the people, “expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures”54—which during the Cold War had been 
loosely interpreted by states to legitimize any sort of 
government—is now understood to require a democratic 
political regime. Thus, there is little doubt today that democracy 
has become a prominent means by which to assess the legitimacy 
of governments.55 This is not to say that a nondemocratic 
government will never be deemed legitimate, especially if that 
government has been in power for a long time.56 The 
nondemocratic character of a government is sometimes 
disregarded because of overriding geopolitical and strategic 
motives.57 But, leaving these exceptional situations aside, it can 
reasonably be argued that, since the end of the Cold War, 
 
53. See Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 193 
(“Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly 
through free and fair elections.”). Contra ROTH, supra note 29, at 417. 
54. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 21, U.N. G.A.O.R., 
3d. Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of 
equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be 
the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic 
and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
Id. This idea has been underpinned by many UN General Assembly resolutions. See, e.g., 
G.A. Res. 56/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/159 (Dec. 19, 2001); G.A. Res. 52/129, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/52/129 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 49/190, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/190 (Dec. 
23, 1994); G.A. Res. 48/131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/131 (Dec. 20, 1993); G.A. Res. 
47/138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/138 (Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991); G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (Dec. 18, 
1990); G.A. Res. 43/157, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/157 (Dec. 8, 1988). 
55. Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 489, 494 (2001); Franck, supra note 18, at 46. 
56. See Marcelo G. Kohen, La création d’Etats en droit international contemporain [The 
Creation of States in Contemporary International Law], 6 COURS EURO-MÉDITERRANÉENS 
BANCAJA DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 546, 619 (2002) (this has led some authors to 
contend that there exist “double standards” in that regard). 
57. The most obvious example is the government of the People’s Republic of 
China, which is seen as legitimate by almost all countries in the world although it does 
not rest on any free and fair electoral process. The same cannot be said with respect to 
Pakistan since the government has relentlessly pledged to organized democratic 
elections. See infra note 84. 
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democracy has become “the touchstone of legitimacy”58 for any 
new government. 
Because democracy has turned into one of the central 
measures to appraise the legitimacy of governments, it is 
important to clarify how democratic legitimacy applies against 
the backdrop of the abovementioned distinction between the 
legitimacy of origin and the legitimacy of exercise. In the context 
of democracy, it is submitted here that the legitimacy of origin 
addresses the procedural elements of democracy that ensure that 
the authority originates in popular sovereignty through free and 
fair elections. A democratic legitimacy of exercise, on the contrary, 
rests on some of the substantive elements of democracy. The 
application of the distinction between legitimacy of exercise and 
legitimacy of origin in the context of democracy thus 
presupposes the existence of a substantive understanding of 
democracy. It must be acknowledged that the idea is slightly 
controversial. 
Indeed the question of whether democracy includes only 
procedural elements or also embodies substantive features has 
gripped the theory59 and the practice60 for a long time. Given the 
 
58. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge 
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 599 (1999). 
59. See LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 8–9 
(1999) (lambasting an “electoral” conception of democracy); Gills et al., supra note 40, 
at 21 (criticizing a “cosmetic” conception of democracy because of its “low intensity”); 
see also MARKS, supra note 32, at 52, 57–75 (the expression “low intensity democracy” 
alludes to the American strategy of containment known as “low intensity warfare”). 
Relying on a definition of democracy close to that supported by theorists like John Rawls 
(A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)), Carl Schmitt (LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer 
trans., Duke University Press, 2004) (1932)), or even Friedrich A. Hayek (supra note 9, 
at 227), these authors have put forward a substance-oriented conception of democracy 
embodying compliance with human rights. See Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic 
Progress, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 493–
95; Thomas Carothers, Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in 
International Law, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 261, 264 (1992). 
60. This debate between procedural democracy and substantive democracy has also 
been echoed in the interpretation of the major human rights conventions. These 
instruments—though they often enshrine a right to political participation through 
regular elections—are hardly explicit on whether an electoral process is the core 
element of a democratic regime. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Independent States 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 29, May 26, 1995, 3 
I.H.R.R. 212; ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 25; American Convention on Human Rights art. 
23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
This is probably because such an affirmation would have barred their adoption by all the 
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complex character of the concept of democracy61 and its bent for 
relentless re-contextualization,62 scholars will probably never 
agree on the accurate meaning of democracy.63 But this should 
not prevent a discussion of its main components. It does not 
seem unreasonable to defend here that the concept of 
democracy includes some substantive requirements, namely some 
basic political freedoms and civil rights64 and hints of the rule of 
law. The reason why some political and civil human rights are 
included in the concept of democracy can be traced back to the 
democratic procedural requirements themselves. There can 
hardly be a free democratic process if basic political rights are 
infringed. The “freedom”65 of elections must take place in a “free 
 
communist regimes during the Cold War. It is not to say that these instruments do not 
refer in any manner to a democratic regime. Indeed, the qualifying clauses are usually 
phrased as to limit interferences with the exercise of human rights with “what is 
necessary in a democratic society.” ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 4; ECHR, supra arts. 8–11. 
According to some authors, this implies that a democratic regime is the sole type of 
governmental system where human rights are respected. See James Crawford, Democracy 
and International Law, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 113, 115 (1993). Whether this is true or not, 
these qualifying clauses more certainly imply that democratic principles are the best 
means to assess the acceptability of interference with some human rights. Be that as it 
may, the idea that democracy furthers the compliance of human rights and, cogently, 
that these instruments somehow lay down an obligation pertaining to the adoption of a 
democratic regime has emerged from both the practice and the interpretation provided 
by the monitoring bodies of these instruments. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. 
Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998). 
61. Martti Koskenniemi, Intolerant Democracies: A Reaction, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 231, 
234 (1996) (responding to Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 
HARV. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995)). 
62. See MARKS, supra note 32, at 151. 
63. But see Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 90. 
64. Even though these authors admit that dire economic conditions can impinge 
on the freedom of the fairness of any electoral process, these authors contend that 
economic, social, and cultural rights are alien to the idea of democracy. These rights are 
not aiming at a democratic organization of the power, but rather a form of social and 
distributive justice. See e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 231 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul eds., 1960) (asserting that distributive justice is 
nondemocratic). But see IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999); Molly Beutz, 
Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 387, 418 
(2003). 
65. The freedom of elections is a more continuous assessment (mostly focused on 
the period of time prior to the elections and the respect of political freedoms), while the 
fairness of elections is all about the electoral process itself. The fairness of elections is 
related to the regularity of elections, which excludes any manipulation by any of the 
competing parties. This requirement is mostly concerned with the rigging of elections. 
Fairness is probably the requirement the respect of which is the most difficult to 
monitor, despite the huge amount of resources devoted to international elections 
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market of ideas”66 that assures free political competition.67 To 
ensure free competition in this market of ideas, the respect for 
basic political freedoms must be ensured. The organization of a 
“free” electoral process requires respect for the freedoms of 
expression, assembly, thought, press, etc.68 These freedoms are 
“democratic rights”69 or, as stated by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, “rights pertaining to democratic governance.”70 
In that sense, one can contend that the requirement of free 
elections already encompasses a substantive component, namely, 
compliance with the political freedoms ensuring pluralism. It 
does not seem unreasonable to contend that the concept of 
democracy also includes respect for the rule of law. As the UN 
Human Rights Committee has emphasized, there can hardly be a 
free and fair election if the rules regulating the electoral process 
have not been established prior to the holding of the election or 
have not been complied with by the authorities.71 
 
monitoring by both intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. In practice, only 
obvious and large-scale riggings will be reported (if the state has consented to 
international elections monitoring or asked for international assistance) and will 
prevent the elections from being deemed as conferring democratic and legitimate 
power to the government. 
66. Franck, supra note 18, at 90. 
67. Beutz, supra note 64, at 418. 
68. See G.A. Res. 55/96, ¶ i, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001) (on the 
promotion and consolidation of democracy); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/57, 
Promotion of the Right to Democracy, E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, ¶ 1(a) (Apr. 27, 1999); 
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/46, Further Measures to Promote and 
Consolidate Democracy, E/CN.4/2002/200, ¶ 1 (Apr. 23, 2003); Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and 
the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 
(July 12, 1996) [hereinafter General Comment No. 25]; see also United Communist Party of 
Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 121; Open Door Counselling Ltd. v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
244, 268 (1992); Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 407 (1986); Handyside v. 
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 737, 762 (1972); Compulsory Membership in 
an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 69 (Nov. 13, 1985); OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 
11, 2001, available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/
Democractic_Charter.htm. See generally Marc Cogen & Eric De Brabandere, Democratic 
Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 669 (2007) (discussing 
the application of these rights in post-conflict reconstruction). 
69.  Richard J. Arneson, Democratic Rights at the National Level, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY 95 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003). 
70. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1997/64, Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, 67th mtg., E/RES/1997/64, ¶ 2(b) (Apr. 16, 1997); see also General 
Comment No. 25, supra note 68, ¶ 12. 
71. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 68, ¶ 10. 
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The inclusion of substantive elements in the concept of 
democracy seems underpinned by contemporary international 
relations, for states often voice their support for “democratic 
values.”72 Likewise, in cases of massive and gross violations of 
human rights, states tend to deny the democratic character of the 
responsible states.73 The mere fact that an infringement of the 
rule of law and human rights, whatever its extent, prompts 
systematic disapproval in the name of democracy demonstrates 
that, in practice, democracy has been construed as including 
certain substantive elements. 
If, as it is argued here, democracy embraces some 
substantive elements, then the distinction between origin and 
exercise proves of fundamental relevance, and any monolithic 
conception of legitimacy reveals itself insufficient to explain how 
legitimacy of global actors is appraised in a post-Cold War world. 
From the standpoint of democratic legitimacy of origin, a 
government is legitimate if it rests on the “will of the people,” 
expressed through a free and fair electoral process. From the 
vantage point of democratic legitimacy of exercise, a government 
is legitimate if it exerts its power in a manner consistent with basic 
political freedoms and the rule of law. Drawing on this distinction 
between the democratic legitimacy of origin and the democratic 
legitimacy of exercise, the next section tries to outline how the 
legitimacy of global actors is evaluated. 
 
72. Commonwealth of Nations, Coolum Declaration (Mar. 5, 2002), available at 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/35468/35799/coolum.htm; see 
also Jo Johnson, EU Observer Attacks Big Flaws in Afghan Poll, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at 
12 (noting an EU observer’s skepticism that democracy would take hold following the 
elections in Afghanistan). 
73. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/7, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (Oct. 11, 1991) (on Haiti); 
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 55/18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/18 (Apr. 23, 
1999) (on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); OAS, 
Declaration on Democracy in Venezuela, OAS Doc. AG/DEC. 28 (XXXII-O/02) (June 4, 
2002); Third International Conference of the New or Restored Democracies on 
Democracy and Development, Sept. 2–4, 1996, Progress Review and Recommendations, 
Adopted by the Third International Conference of the New or Restored Democracies on 
Democracy and Development Held at Bucharest from Sept. 2–4, 1997, in Note Verbale 
dated Sept. 10, 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/52/334 (Sept. 11, 1997). 
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III. CONTEMPORARY OSCILLATIONS BETWEEN EXERCISE 
AND ORIGIN  
This section aims to demonstrate that the legitimacy of 
governments and the legitimacy of international organizations 
are subject to contradictory logic. On the one hand, it will be 
shown that, in modern practice, the legitimacy of governments—
classically judged from the standpoint of the origin of its 
powers—is incrementally tested on the basis of legitimacy of 
exercise.74 On the other hand, when the legitimacy of 
international organizations is at stake, it will be explained that 
their legitimacy is increasingly evaluated from the vantage point 
of their origin, as opposed to legitimacy of exercise, which has 
been the classic measure of their legitimacy. 
A. Legitimacy of Governments: From Origin to Exercise 
The question of governmental legitimacy has always been a 
source of great controversy. This can be traced back to a basic 
reality of the international order, namely, that states act through 
their governments. The international order is consequently an 
order in which its main actors act via proxies. These surrogates 
are not, however, immutable entities. Indeed, governments are 
short-lived bodies whose existence is contingent upon the form or 
stability of the political regime of the state concerned, and 
ultimately, the life span of the human beings at their helm. This 
means that the representatives of the states in the international 
order are frequently replaced. This recurrent and inescapable 
change of governments has prompted a need for criteria to 
determine who is entitled to speak and act on behalf of each 
state. This necessity to constantly identify each state’s 
representative in the international arena lies at the heart of the 
question of legitimacy of governments in international relations. 
The highly controversial character of governments’ 
legitimacy mostly stems from the subjectivity of its evaluation. 
Indeed, there are no objective criteria to determine 
governments’ legitimacy. That means that each state enjoys 
comfortable leeway when asked to recognize the power of an 
entity that claims to be another state’s representative in their 
 
74. This section constitutes a condensed version of the abovementioned article, 
d’Aspremont, supra note 22. 
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bilateral intercourse. International relations are therefore replete 
with situations where a government is deemed legitimate by some 
states and illegitimate by others. 
It is submitted here that, despite the prominent role played 
by elections in legitimizing governments in contemporary 
practice, the “monopoly” of the legitimacy of origin to gauge the 
legitimacy of governments has recently been curtailed by the 
growing importance of the legitimacy of exercise. This means that for a 
government to be seen as legitimate, it must not only be “by the 
people” but also “for the people.” 
The authors have analyzed this practice elsewhere75 and 
contemporary developments have confirmed it;76 it would be of 
no avail to reiterate conclusions here. It suffices to recall that in 
the practice pertaining to recognition, accreditation, and 
intervention demonstrate that both the origin and exercise of 
power have played a role in evaluating governments’ legitimacy. 
The legitimacy of origin has remained the decisive factor. 
However, recent practice shows that more emphasis has been put 
on the legitimacy of exercise. To understand the different roles 
played by the two types of legitimacy, and hence the paradigm 
shift, one must draw a distinction between the qualification and 
disqualification of governments. If a new government secures 
international recognition or its delegates are accredited, it 
qualifies as the legitimate representative entitled to speak and act 
on behalf of the state. But lack of legitimacy can have a 
disqualifying function when a government, previously recognized 
as the legitimate representative entitled to act and speak on 
behalf of a state, loses this recognition. In other words, it is 
disqualified from being the representative of that state. In the case 
of intervention by invitation, disqualification occurs when the 
state’s requests for intervention are refused. In the case of the 
accreditation of delegates by international organizations, 
disqualification occurs when the state’s delegates are refused 
accreditation. This Article argues that the effect of the legitimacy 
of origin test has been confined to a qualification role, whereas the 
 
75. See id. 
76. See, for instance, the recent debate about the increase of American military 
efforts in Afghanistan on the occasion of which the American administration has 
engaged in a review of the legitimacy of the Karzai government. See, e.g., Peter Baker & 
Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Wants Afghan “Partner,” INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 20, 2009, at 3. 
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legitimacy of exercise has been confined to a disqualification 
function. 
1. Qualifying Governments: The Primary Role of the Legitimacy 
of Origin 
The question of whether a regime qualifies as the legitimate 
government of a state has almost always been resolved through 
the legitimacy of origin test. States must determine the legitimate 
authority entitled to act and speak on behalf of a state in 
instances of recognition and accreditation. As illustrated by the 
discussion above, a new government will typically be recognized 
so long as its power originates from a free and fair electoral 
process. It has also been shown that such democratic origins can 
usually overcome a government’s ineffectiveness. In the case of 
credential controversies within international organizations, only 
the democratic (or constitutional) origin of a government 
generally matters. When the question of the qualification of a 
new government arises, only the legitimacy of origin has been 
considered. The way in which government exercises (or plans to 
exercise) its power has been discounted so long as it has been 
democratically (and constitutionally) elected. 
The exercise of power has, on the other hand, been the 
basis for the disqualification of a government previously 
considered the legitimate representative of a state. A legitimately 
elected government can lose its legitimacy and be barred from 
speaking and acting on behalf of the state because its exercise of 
power conflicts with substantive elements of democracy. This is 
well illustrated by the aforementioned practice regarding 
invitations for intervention. Likewise, the UN General Assembly 
disqualified the government of South Africa due to the way in 
which the government was exercising its power, namely, through 
its racist apartheid policy. 
This distribution of roles between the legitimacy of exercise 
and the legitimacy of origin is not at all surprising. Indeed, no 
one disputes the necessity in contemporary international 
relations for a swift assessment of governments’ legitimacy to 
determine who can act and speak on behalf of a state. Indeed, no 
state or international organization can afford to leave the 
determination of the legitimacy of a foreign government—upon 
which any conclusion as to who can act on behalf of the foreign 
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state depends—pending for long. Against this backdrop, it is not 
surprising that legitimacy of exercise is avoided in qualification 
situations. An appraisal of the legitimacy of a government’s 
exercise of power necessarily requires that the government has 
exercised power over a period of time. In cases of an 
unconstitutional change of government or credentials 
controversies, there has yet to be any “exercise” of power. As 
such, the legitimacy of exercise test does not comport with the 
necessity for swift determination of a state’s legitimate 
representatives.77 In this context, the origin of power has been 
seen as a more appropriate test of legitimacy. It is easy to 
understand how the origin of a government can be quickly 
assessed.78 Legitimate origins entail a free and fair electoral 
 
77. The refusal of accreditations of the delegates of South Africa during the 
apartheid period for reasons pertaining to legitimacy of exercise was possible because 
the credentials of delegates are reviewed every year and the apartheid government had 
been in power for a significant period of time. For an analysis of this question, see 
d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 903. 
78. It must be pointed out, however, that the primarily qualificatory role of 
legitimacy of origin has been possible only because the periodicity of electoral process, 
has been downplayed. That means that the periodicity of elections (and the related 
willingness of the democratically elected government to undergo future electoral 
processes) is not taken into account when determining the legitimacy of government. 
This practice demonstrates that the evaluation of the legitimacy of origin generally does 
not include any consideration of the sustainable character of electoral origins. It could 
be reasonably argued that this contempt for the criterion of periodicity of elections 
probably conflicts with several international texts. See, e.g., International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 46, art. 25 (“Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without 
unreasonable restrictions: . . . (b) [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 21 (“The will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be 
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”) (emphasis added); see also 
G.A. Res. 55/96, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001) (on promoting and 
consolidating democracy); General Comment No. 25, supra note 68, ¶ 9. For additional 
General Assembly resolutions concerned with “[s]trengthening the role of the UN in 
enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and 
promotion of democratization,” see generally G.A. Res. 58/180, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/58/180 (Mar. 17, 2004); G.A. Res. 56/159, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 52/129, 
supra note 54; G.A. Res. 50/185, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/185 (Mar. 6, 1996); G.A. Res. 
49/190, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 48/131, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 47/138, supra note 54; 
G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 45/150, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 43/157, 
supra note 54; Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 68, art. 4. On the periodicity 
of elections and what it actually means, see Sarah Joseph, Rights and Political Participation, 
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process, so foreign states can typically just rely on the accounts of 
elections monitoring missions sent by international organizations 
to quickly make their decisions.79 To put it differently, free and 
fair elections are “easier to capture” than the substantive 
elements of democracy.80 This is the reason why the legitimacy of 
exercise has not played a role in the qualification of governments 
and has been confined to a disqualification function. 
Qualification of governments has almost exclusively rested on the 
legitimacy of origin. 
2. Illiberal Democracies: Turning to the Legitimacy of Exercise 
Having demonstrated that the legitimacy of origin has 
played an important qualification role while the legitimacy of 
exercise has been moderately used in disqualification situations, 
mostly in situations of intervention by invitation, this Article 
argues that the disqualification role of legitimacy of exercise is 
due to increase dramatically with respect to the recognition of 
governments and the accreditation of their delegates within 
international organizations because of the persistence of illiberal 
democracies. By “illiberal democracy” this Article means a 
democratically elected government exercising its powers in 
violation of the substantive elements of democracy.81 There are 
many nations whose governments are elected through a more or 
less free and fair electoral process, but commit blatant violations 
of human rights. To identify just a few examples, recent elections 
in Egypt,82 Iran,83 Pakistan,84 Palestine,85 and Tunisia86 may well 
 
in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED 
KINGDOM 535, 554 (David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds., 1995). 
79. For example, see the electoral missions set up by the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights at http://www.osce.org/odihr/ (last visited Oct. 25, 
2010). Regarding UN electoral missions, see G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 54, ¶ 3 (on 
enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine 
Elections: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (Dec. 19, 1991) 
(discussing the close relationship between UN electoral missions and election 
processes). See generally Margaret Satterthwaite, Human Rights Monitoring, Elections 
Monitoring, and Electoral Assistance as Preventive Measures, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 
(1998). 
80. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracies, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 
1997, at 22, 40 (1997). 
81. See id. at 22. 
82. See Michael Slackman et al., Egypt Pushes 2-Year Delay in Local Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2006, at A1. 
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have been free, but the elected government has not always 
proved committed to respecting basic human rights. 
The persistence of illiberal democracies has already 
prompted some Western states to reconsider their policy in 
matters of democratization.87 These policies have, so far, largely 
relied on the assumption that free and fair elections directly 
correspond with respect for human rights.88 This Article argues 
that among the changes that will be brought about by the 
persistence of illiberal democracies in the international arena 
will be a revamping of the way that governmental legitimacy is 
assessed. More specifically, this Article argues that the legitimacy 
of exercise will play a greater disqualification role in the 
accreditations processes within international organizations. 
Indeed, in the case of the accreditation of delegates from a 
democratically elected government, the legitimacy of exercise 
could be a factor prompting the refusal of credentials. An 
international organization could refuse to recognize delegates 
from a government whose exercise of power is significantly at 
odds with the substantive elements of democracy. Denying 
accreditation to delegates from illiberal democracies would 
undoubtedly increase the disqualification role of the legitimacy 
of exercise, as a government would be judged according to the 
manner in which it exercises power. 
Likewise, illiberal democracies will drive states to reconsider 
their policy on recognition. The legitimacy of exercise could 
affect recognition in two ways. First, it could induce states to not 
 
83. See Michael Ignatieff, Iranian Lessons, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 51. 
84. See Barry Bearak, Awaiting Clinton, Pakistani Takes Election Step, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 2000, at A8; Barry Bearak, Democracy in Pakistan: Can a General Be Trusted?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, § 1, at 12; Jane Perlez, Clinton Decides to Visit Pakistan, After All, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A12. 
85. See Steven Erlanger, After the Elections: The Leadership; Hamas Leader Sees No 
Change Toward Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 1, at 1; Francis Fukuyama, After 
Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2006, at 67; James Glanz, The World: Blowback; 
A Little Democracy or a Genie Unbottled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 4, at 1. 
86. See Editorial, Undemocratic Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at A18. 
87. This phenomenon has, for example, triggered an important debate about the 
United States’ foreign policy priorities. See Hassan M. Fattah, Arab Democracy, a U.S. Goal, 
Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1; Steven R. Weisman, Diplomatic Memo; Democracy 
Push by Bush Attracts Doubters in Party, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at A1. 
88. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 60; see also Organization of American States (OAS): 
Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 7, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289; United 
Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 20–22 (1998). 
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recognize a government whose expected policies are likely to be 
contrary to the substantive elements of democracy. Second, if the 
expected exercise of power does not deter states from granting 
recognition, a subsequent exercise of power inconsistent with 
human rights could then lead to a withdrawal of previous 
recognition. 
It must be acknowledged that the withdrawal of recognition 
is extremely rare in practice. The withdrawal of recognition of 
the government based in Taiwan and the simultaneous 
recognition of the communist government based in Beijing as 
the government of China may be one of very few examples.89 The 
growing importance of legitimacy of exercise could spawn a 
sweeping change in this respect, thereby making withdrawal of 
recognition of governments more common. Contemporary 
practice already contains some hints of this leaning, as is 
illustrated by the partial withdrawal of recognition of the branch 
of the Palestinian Authority controlled by Hamas.90 
Because the legitimacy of governments is assessed in a few 
specific situations, states have only a limited number of tools to 
deal with the difficulties caused by illiberal democracies. 
Recognition and accreditation are two of these instruments, and 
it would be surprising if they were not used to fight the 
persistence of illiberal democracies. Accordingly, this Article 
argues that there will be an expansion of the disqualification role 
of the legitimacy of exercise through the practice of the 
recognition of governments and the accreditation of delegates 
within international organizations. These changes would thus 
underpin the disqualification role already played by the 
legitimacy of exercise in situations of intervention by invitation. 
 
89. See Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of Recognition and the Status of the 
Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE. L. 193, 193 (1989); Victor H. Li, The Law of Non-
Recognition: The Case of Taiwan, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 134, 134 (1979). On the legal 
status of dependent states, see generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198–220 (1979). 
90. In addition to suspending aid to the government, several countries completely 
severed their relations. See Steven R. Weisman & Craig S. Smith, U.S. and Europe Halt Aid 
to Palestinian Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2006, at A6; Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Digs In 
on Withholding Aid to Hamas Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A12. But see Joel 
Brinkley, France Backs Putin on Speaking to Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at A7; Steven 
Lee Myers & Greg Myre, In Moscow, Hamas Delegation Gets a Warning and a Crash Course 
in Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at A6. 
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This section has argued that the disqualification role of 
legitimacy of exercise is currently gaining momentum. This 
tendency represents a paradigm shift in the manner in which 
legitimacy of governments is appraised. The next section will 
show that the practice pertaining to international organizations 
has experienced the exact opposite phenomenon. 
B. Legitimacy of International Organizations: From Exercise to Origin 
From a conventional perspective, international 
organizations derive their legitimacy from the powers that have 
been conferred to them by the member states of that 
organization. The source of their powers is thus only very briefly 
tested through the consent of states when signing the 
constitutional treaty of the organization.91 In this sense, the 
legitimacy of origin of international organizations is not 
necessarily a controversial issue. Consequently, international 
organizations need to ensure that they exercise their powers in 
conformity with the functions assigned to them by the states. 
Therefore, international organizations traditionally buoy their 
legitimacy by ensuring that decision making in respect to the 
exercise of their specific functions is in conformity with the 
institutional law of the organization and international law. This is 
a manifestation of what previous sections described as the 
legitimacy of exercise. 
It is submitted here that the way in which authority is 
exercised by international organizations—traditionally viewed as 
the criterion that measures the legitimacy of these institutions—
is increasingly subjected to the growing importance of how 
authority to exercise certain activity is granted to international 
organizations, i.e., the legitimacy they can derive from the origin 
of their power. Recent developments in the role and functions of 
international organizations, such as the increasing involvement 
of international organizations in the exercise of governmental 
functions, have indeed caused a cross-fertilization of both forms 
of legitimacy, with a clear move from the legitimacy of exercise to 
various forms of legitimacy of origin. The question of how power 
is bestowed upon international organizations, especially for those 
 
91. On the idea of consent as a basis of legitimacy, see Buchanan, supra note 1, at 
90–94. 
  
216 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:190 
activities having potential or effective far-reaching influence on 
the daily lives of citizens, has become an essential question in 
international law and international relations. This section starts 
by depicting the traditional conception of institutional legitimacy 
before turning to several developments that evidence the move 
toward the legitimacy of origin of international organizations. 
This section then addresses how the dual character of the 
legitimacy of international organizations has manifested itself in 
the reconstruction and administration of states in post-conflict 
situations.92 
1. International Organizations and the Legitimate Exercise of 
Powers 
International organizations, although created by states, 
cannot be seen as their equivalent, especially in terms of 
democratic legitimacy. Decision making at the international level 
by international organizations lacks any direct electoral 
foundation since they have no direct popular legitimacy of 
origin. For these reasons, the functioning of international 
organizations and global governance is often generally 
considered to be naturally illegitimate93 or “undemocratic.”94 
However, since an international organization is created by 
states, the source and legitimacy of the exercise of powers by 
international organizations is derived from the consent validly 
expressed by the different states party to the constitutional treaty 
of the organization. Since states and their governments are to be 
considered as the legitimate representatives of the population in 
their territory, under the conditions described and discussed in 
the sections above, the delegation of certain powers to 
international organizations by these representatives is indirectly 
based on a form of popular consent. Consequently, the exercise 
of powers by international organizations cannot be considered 
 
92. On the contemporary practice of international administration of territories, see 
DE BRABANDERE, supra note 20. 
93. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1515 (2006). 
94. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2017–
21 (2004). 
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illegitimate by definition, although its legitimacy will often not be 
“democratic” as is traditionally understood.95 
In light of this lack of direct legitimacy of origin, and the 
absence of a periodical legitimacy or accountability test through 
direct elections or any other mechanism, the legitimacy of 
international organizations has been classically addressed 
through the way in which the functions were exercised, i.e., 
through the legitimacy of exercise. The exercise of powers by 
international organizations is then subjected to a legitimacy 
assessment principally through the procedures followed,96 often 
referred to as input legitimacy.97 From a legal perspective, the 
most obvious method to ensure the legitimate exercise of powers 
by an international organization, with a focus on the procedural 
aspects of decision making, is to ensure that the decisions are in 
conformity with the legal obligations of the international 
organization,98 particularly in terms of the legal restraints 
stemming from the application of international law and the 
organization’s constitution. Especially when international 
organizations take actions that have a potential impact on human 
rights, such as in the case of the Security Council, there is a 
tendency to subject this exercise of power to some form of ex 
post facto legitimacy or legality check.99 Traditionally, the 
international community views as legitimate an international 
 
95. See Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 646 
(1999). 
96. On the issue of procedural legitimacy and fairness, see FRANCK, supra note 5, at 
204–07; Franck, supra note 5, at 705. Another method is to assess the substantive 
outcome of the decisions of international organizations, which is, however, more a 
question of effectiveness of the organizations than a question of legitimacy and legitimate 
exercise of functions. On the issue of substantive legitimacy, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of Administrative Functions: The Example of 
the International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
International Fisheries Organizations, 9 GER. L.J. 2039, 2040 (2008). The substantive 
outcome of the decisions of international organizations is then referred to as output 
legitimacy. 
97. See generally Markus Krajewski, International Organizations or Institutions, 
Democratic Legitimacy, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008). 
98. With respect to Security Council actions, see ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII 
POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004). 
99. See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 
221–28 (2d ed. 2009). 
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organization’s decision when made within the limits of its 
constitutional treaty.100 
Of course, the issue of legitimacy is closely connected to the 
accountability of international organizations, which functions as 
a test for the legitimate exercise of power. It is an issue that has 
been taken up, inter alia, by the International Law Association’s 
Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations. 
The Committee, in its final report, noted that “as a matter of 
principle, accountability is linked to the authority and power of 
an [international organization]. Power entails accountability, 
that is, the duty to account for its exercise.”101 The Committee 
identified three levels of accountability. The first level is non-
legal, and relates to the extent to which international 
organizations, in the exercise of their functions, subject 
themselves to certain forms of “internal and external scrutiny 
and monitoring.”102 The second and third levels concern tort-
based liability and international responsibility for breaches of 
rules of international or institutional law, respectively. The 
importance of the latter two forms of accountability is also shown 
through the recent work of the International Law Commission in 
the codification and progressive development of rules regarding 
the responsibility of international organizations.103 These three 
levels of accountability, including the work of the International 
Law Commission on the responsibility of international 
organizations, are manifestations of the traditional measurement 
of the legitimacy of international organizations, which is how the 
functions are exercised. 
Against this backdrop, and taking into account the 
legitimacy of international organizations derived from the 
consent expressed by the member states, the debate on the 
legitimacy of origin of international organizations is, in theory, 
relatively unequivocal. International organizations habitually, 
and as a matter of principle, have no ambition to govern a place 
 
100. See id.; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS 219–21 (1995). 
101. COMM. ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INT’L ORGS., INT’L LAW ASS’N [ILA], 
FINAL REPORT, BERLIN CONFERENCE 5 (2004). 
102. Id. 
103. For the latest report of the Special Rapporteur and discussion of this topic in 
the International Law Commission, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, May 4–June 5, July 6–Aug. 7, U.N. Doc. A/64/10 (2009). 
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or people. Therefore, the need to establish legitimacy of origin 
appears to be a theoretical issue only. Of course, the question of 
the legitimacy of origin of international organizations has 
particular relevance for those organizations that have activities 
that go beyond mere technical interstate cooperation.104 This is 
also why the question of the legitimacy of origin of international 
institutions has traditionally not been addressed in international 
legal scholarship. Indeed, a few decades ago, the activities of 
international organizations had been relatively weak with respect 
to effectively exercised authority and the question of their 
legitimacy was, as a consequence, of little relevance.105 Thus, one 
can say that the combination of the multiplication of areas in 
which international organizations are currently involved, and the 
altered interconnection and relation between international 
organizations and other actors have, from a factual perspective, 
sparked the legitimacy debate of international institutions.106 
2. Institutional Legitimacy: From the Legitimacy of Origin to 
the Legitimacy of Exercise and Back 
Traditionally, when an organization’s activity has had an 
impact on the state and individuals, international organizations 
have, in the exercise of their functions, relied on the general or 
ad hoc consent of states.107 However, several developments 
confirm that with increasing frequency, international 
organizations are seeking to establish a form of legitimacy of 
origin beyond the mere consent of the member states and 
beyond the legitimacy of the exercise of their functions. As a 
consequence, the dual character of the legitimacy of 
international organizations has recently been at the forefront of 
legal and political discourse through the greater involvement of 
organizations in several areas. 
The first development toward the establishment of a form of 
legitimacy of origin relates to the European Union. The 
functioning and legitimacy of the European Union now lies at 
the intersection of states and international organizations in terms 
 
104. Krajewski, supra note 97, ¶ 11. 
105. Bodansky, supra note 58, at 597. 
106. L. Boisson de Chazournes, Changing Roles of International Organizations: Global 
Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 655, 665 (2009). 
107. Bodansky, supra note 58, at 597. 
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of democratic legitimacy. Evidence of this is the direct election by 
the citizens of the Members of the European Parliament. As 
such, the legitimacy of the EU in the exercise of its function is 
very well established, since the decisions of the various 
institutions of the European Community are, under certain 
conditions, subject to direct judicial scrutiny by the General 
Court (formerly the European Court of First Instance) or the 
Court of Justice. But the direct elections of the members of the 
EU Parliament are important for the EU because it adds a 
popular legitimacy of origin to the exercise of its functions. This 
has particular relevance taking into consideration the undeniably 
strong(er) impact of the EU’s decisions on the daily lives of the 
European citizens. It is also for the same reason that several 
Member States have decided to organize referenda in order to 
add a certain popular legitimacy to the proposed institutional 
changes.108 
The discussions on the reform of the United Nations 
Security Council and the need to expand the (permanent) 
membership of the Security Council is a second example that 
evidences an apparent shift from the legitimacy of exercise to the 
legitimacy of origin in assessing institutional legitimacy. The 
question of whether a decision is made in conformity with the 
UN Charter and principles of international law, i.e., whether a 
decision is legitimate from the perspective of the exercise of 
functions, is incrementally being complemented by the question 
of whether the Security Council as an institution has the 
necessary legitimacy to make certain decisions.109 The 
recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, which besides suggesting a set of 
guidelines to be used by the Security Council in its decision-
making process (legitimacy of exercise), proposed a reform of 
the Council in order to “increase the democratic and 
 
108. See J.H.H. Weiler, A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, 40 J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD. 563 (2002) (discussing the constitutional treaty and the legitimacy question 
in the EU). On the question of the referenda, see Jirí Zemánek, Consent of Parliament or 
People’s Referendum?, in A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: THE IGC, THE RATIFICATION 
PROCESS AND BEYOND 141–48 (Ingolf Pernice & Jirí Zemánek eds., 2005). 
109. See generally J. Taubman, Towards a Theory of Democratic Compliance: Security 
Council Legitimacy and Effectiveness after Iraq, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 161, 192 (2004). 
  
2011] LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 
accountable nature of the body” (legitimacy of origin).110 Former 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report In 
Larger Freedom, also criticized the lack of legitimacy of origin of 
the Security Council by stating, “[T]he Security Council has 
increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the end of 
the cold war, has enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its 
permanent members but has seen that authority questioned on 
the grounds that its composition is anachronistic or insufficiently 
representative.”111 Therefore, the Secretary-General suggested to 
make the Security Council more broadly representative of the 
international community as a whole.112 The justification for the 
authority of the Security Council is thus no longer seen as a 
consequence of state consent to the constitutional treaty of the 
organization, which grants certain functions and powers to the 
Security Council, but rather the “universal” acceptance of certain 
decisions. The guarantee that the Security Council exercises its 
functions within the framework and limits set by the UN Charter 
and international law thus is increasingly complemented by a 
tendency to ensure that the origin of functions exercised by that 
organ is “democratic.” Of course, and as noted, these 
developments towards the legitimacy of origin are both a 
consequence of, and proportional to the impact of the activity of, 
the organization on the population. The debate on the 
legitimacy of origin of international organizations has little or no 
relevance for those organizations of which the direct impact on 
the population is limited. 
The third development is the increased influence of 
international economic and financial institutions on the public 
policy decisions of states, and the coinciding renewed attention 
paid to the legitimacy of these institutions. In particular, the 
involvement of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) in the financial development of states on the one 
hand, and the strengthened impact of the World Trade 
 
110. Chair of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, Report of 
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, transmitted by Note of the Secretary General, ¶ 249, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 
2, 2004). 
111. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 165, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 
2005). 
112. Id. ¶ 169. 
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Organization (“WTO”) and its dispute settlement mechanism on 
various non-trade policies on the other hand, have been 
subjected to increased scrutiny in terms of legitimacy. As noted in 
the previous paragraphs, the legitimacy of many international 
organizations has in the past attracted only little attention, 
principally because their activity was limited in terms of impact 
on the state or the individuals. The growing impact of 
international institutions on the domestic affairs of the state, and 
thus on the nationals of the state, has brought about an increased 
attention to the legitimacy of institutions in taking or imposing 
far-reaching measures on the state. International financial and 
trade institutions, in particular, have seen a considerable 
intensification of the impact of their rules, regulations, and 
policies, not only on states, but also and mainly, as a 
consequence, on individuals. 
For example, the impact of the Bretton Woods institutions 
on the human rights situations in states has seriously expanded 
in the past decades. Traditionally, international financial 
institutions did not have the authority to address human rights 
issues under their respective constitutions.113 The World Bank, 
for instance, was at its inception prohibited from conditioning 
loans on political or non-economic considerations.114 The IMF 
also traditionally paid little attention to human rights 
considerations, since, as stated by its General Counsel Mr. 
Gianviti, the IMF indeed is a monetary agency and not a 
development agency.115 These traditional perspectives stand in 
contrast with an undeniable amplification of the effects of 
international financial institutions’ policies on states and 
individuals, which in turn has prompted a debate on the 
legitimacy of international financial institutions in general. 
Discussions on the legitimacy of international financial and trade 
institutions have resulted in a renewed attention to the legitimacy 
 
113. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 142 
(2006). 
114. See Marc Cogen, Human Rights, Prohibition of Political Activities and the Lending-
Policies of Worldbank and International Monetary Fund, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (Subrata Roy Chowdhury et al., eds., 1992). 
115. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cult. Rights, Rep. on the 
Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Sessions, ¶ 988, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2001/17 (April 23–May 11, August 13–31, November 12–30, 2001); see also 
François Gianviti, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund, 
in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 132 (Philip Alston ed. 2005). 
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of origin of these institutions. As will be discussed, the perceived 
lack of legitimacy has principally been remedied by attempts 
either to rethink the distribution of voting powers or to accept 
some form of public participation in order to ensure a “popular” 
acceptance of institutional policies. As far as the latter is 
concerned, a clear parallel can be drawn with what was 
mentioned earlier with respect to the legitimacy of the EU and 
the attempts there to establish some form of popular legitimacy. 
When viewed from the traditional perspective, international 
financial institutions, like any other international organization, 
derive their legitimacy from the powers that have been conferred 
on them by the member states of that organization. The source 
of their powers is thus principally tested through the consent of 
states. However, a unique characteristic of international financial 
institutions, such as the IMF, is that the unequal financial 
contributions of donor states to the institutions as a whole and to 
specific projects in other states has resulted in a departure from 
the “traditional” equality in voting rights in favor of a weighted 
vote.116 Although the principle of weighted voting can easily be 
defended taking into account the financial character of these 
institutions,117 this peculiarity has raised the important question 
of the legitimacy of the organization especially when dealing with 
projects in developing countries that have no or little 
representation in the institution.118 The IMF’s recent review of 
the distribution of voting power is clear evidence of the attempt 
to enhance and reinforce the legitimacy of origin of the IMF 
because of the changed factual realities.119 
 
116. See SERGEI A. VOITOVICH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 78 (1995). 
117. I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, International Economic Law: General Course on Public 
International Law, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 118 (1986); see MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER 210 (1979) (critiquing weighted voting). 
118. See N. Matz, Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy—A Legal 
Analysis of the World Bank, Global Environment Facility and Prototype Carbon Fund, 5 INT’L 
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 265, 270 (2005). 
119. See generally ARIEL BUIRA, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without 
Legitimacy?, in REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 7–43 
(2005); J. M Griesgraber, Reforms for Major New Roles of the International Monetary Fund? 
The IMF Post–G-20 Summit, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 179 (2009); D. P. Rapkin & J. R. 
Strand, Reforming the IMF’s Weighted Voting System, 29 WORLD ECON. 305 (2006). 
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Here one can easily see the interplay between the forms of 
legitimacy described and discussed above. While traditionally the 
consent of the states, coupled with the exercise of institutional 
powers in conformity with the functions assigned to them by the 
states and the respect for international law and other internal 
procedures, would have been a sufficient legitimacy test, the 
growing impact of financial institutions’ policies on both the 
state and individuals has prompted new considerations of the 
question of the source of the authority of the institution. 
The renewed attention to the legitimacy of origin of 
international financial institutions is only part of the recent 
attempt of these institutions to enhance their legitimacy, and, of 
course, is principally based on the “unequal” distribution of 
voting power within these institutions. However, besides the 
question of how power is bestowed upon these institutions, 
enhancing public participation in both decision-making and 
dispute settlement processes forms an important part of the 
debate.120 To a large extent, public participation is a form of 
legitimacy of origin, since it aims to ensure that the general 
public supports the exercise of power. Individuals are often seen 
as the final recipients of the adopted rules and regulations and 
are thus given a sense of ownership in the process.121 This form 
of legitimacy of origin thus complements, rather than replaces, the 
consent of states as the original legitimacy of international 
institutions. 
An example of this development at the level of the World 
Bank is the establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
The Inspection Panel can receive requests for inspection from 
any party that is a community of persons, “such as an 
organization, association, society or other grouping of 
individuals,” who need to show that their “rights or interests have 
been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or omission 
of the Bank.”122 Although the Inspection Panel will review 
whether the Bank is complying with its own policies and 
procedures, which essentially is a question of legitimacy of exercise, 
 
120. See Matz, supra note 118, at 271–72. 
121. See Bodansky, supra note 58, at 617. See generally Boisson de Chazournes, supra 
note 106, at 665 (discussing the links between the concepts of transparency and 
participation). 
122. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. [IBRD], The World Bank Inspection 
Panel, Resolution No. IBRD 93-10, ¶ 12 (Sept. 22, 1993). 
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the reason behind the establishment of the Panel is to increase 
public participation by non-state actors in the activities carried 
out by the World Bank and thus to add legitimacy of origin to the 
World Bank.123 
A similar development has taken place at the WTO, albeit at 
a different level. The “legitimacy gap” at the WTO in fact has 
been the result of two different discourses. On the one hand, 
representatives from developing member states have had the 
impression of being excluded from mainly informal decision-
making processes. On the other hand, representatives of civil 
society criticize the organization for its lack of consideration of 
non-state and non-corporate interests in decision-making and 
dispute settlement procedures, thus lacking a genuine legitimacy 
of origin.124 The first issue essentially relates to a critique of the 
legitimacy in the functioning of the organization and thus to the 
legitimacy of exercise of the organization, while the latter 
fundamentally concerns the need to broaden the legitimacy of 
origin of the WTO. 
Thus, the legitimacy problem of the WTO is essentially 
linked to the difficult societal acceptance of the institution and 
its policies.125 This is despite the indisputable existence of a 
legitimacy of origin based on the consent of member states, 
which is expressed through their signature and ratification of the 
WTO constitution. However, since international economic law is 
traditionally open only to states, only state—and perhaps 
corporate—interests are represented at the WTO level, thus 
effectively disregarding broader public or transnational interests. 
Trade disputes, however, increasingly involve other policy areas, 
such as human rights and environmental issues.126 Since the 
 
123. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Compliance with Operational Standards: 
The Contribution of the World Bank Inspection Panel, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE 
WORLD BANK: A DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 67, 67–85 (Gudmundur Alfredsson 
& Rolf Ring eds., 2001). 
124. See Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of 
WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 167 (2001); Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental 
Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 123, 131 (1998). 
125. See Esty, supra note 124, at 167–86 (discussing the ways in which the WTO can 
embrace NGO participation, thereby improving its economic management role). 
126. See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-
Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1043 (1994) (arguing that neither trade 
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WTO is ill-equipped to consider such non-state concerns due to 
its traditional interstate character, it has habitually been regarded 
as closed, lacking both transparency and legitimacy.127 Here 
again, one can clearly see that institutional legitimacy is closely 
interconnected with the impact of international organizations on 
individuals directly or indirectly through policy decisions taken 
by the organization. 
The legitimacy gap at the WTO has resulted in many 
scholarly discussions and proposals to enhance and restore the 
legitimacy of the WTO.128 Proposals include, inter alia, an 
increased role for national parliaments and even the 
establishment of a WTO Parliamentary Assembly.129 These 
suggestions, however, although theoretically sound, do not seem 
to be realistically practical in the short term. A more realistic 
suggestion is to rely on increased public participation and 
enhanced transparency.130 Public participation at various stages 
of the WTO system, through the representative function of 
NGOs, has been envisaged in the legal literature. NGO 
participation as amici curiae in dispute settlement procedures,131 
but also, for example, their participation through consultation at 
the decision-making level and through access to documents, have 
been suggested and also partly implemented.132 Similarly, a high-
 
bodies, like GATT, which was the predecessor to the WTO, nor adjudicatory bodies are 
the right forums for resolving trade or environment disputes). 
127. See Sungjoon Cho, A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 391–99 
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education and social marketing can improve the WTO’s legitimacy); Esty, supra note 
124, at 123. 
128. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 106, at 656–66; Krajewski, supra note 
97, at ¶¶ 13–24(discussing the different forms of “remedies” to the legitimacy problems 
of international institutions). 
129. Krajewski, supra note 124, at 183. 
130. See Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade 
Organization, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927, 928 (2004). 
131. For general information on NGO participation in international dispute 
settlement, see Eric De Brabandere, Non-State Actors in International Dispute Settlement: 
Pragmatism in International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM–
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean 
d’Aspremont ed., forthcoming 2011). 
132. For an overview of NGO involvement in the WTO, see Yves Bonzon, 
Institutionalizing Public Participation in WTO Decision Making: Some Conceptual Hurdles and 
Avenues, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 751, 751–77 (2008); Charnovitz, supra note 130, at 927, 
939–42; Frank Loy, Public Participation in the World Trade Organization, in THE ROLE OF 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 113, 118–21 (Gary P. 
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level panel report on the future of the WTO issued on the tenth 
anniversary of the organization, The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (otherwise known as 
the Sutherland Report), indirectly tackled the WTO’s legitimacy 
problem. Without explicitly mentioning the legitimacy of the 
WTO, however, the report contains a chapter entitled 
“Transparency and Dialogue with Civil Society,” which is aimed 
at remedying and countering the often alleged lack of legitimacy 
and transparency of the institution.133 NGO and civil society 
participation cannot, however, solve every legitimacy problem, 
and, as already noted, is insufficient for replacing the legitimacy 
of origin conferred on the organization through state consent. 
Such participation does not necessarily enhance democratic 
legitimacy, since NGO are themselves nondemocratic in the 
sense that they are neither generally elected nor accountable to 
their members or the general public.134 
This section has argued that international organizations 
traditionally have, in the exercise of their functions, relied on the 
general or ad hoc consent of states to legitimize the exercise of 
their powers. Due to the increasing impact of the activities of 
international organizations on the state and individuals, however, 
international organizations are increasingly seeking to establish a 
form of legitimacy of origin that goes well beyond the mere 
consent of member states and the legitimacy of exercise, which is 
the traditional measuring tool of institutional legitimacy. 
3. Institutional Legitimacy and Post-Conflict International 
Administrations  
Traditionally, the UN’s task in conflict or post-conflict 
situations was limited to the deployment of military personnel 
 
Sampson ed., 2001); Peter Van den Bossche, NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative 
Perspective, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 718, 718–49 (2008). 
133. CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SUPACHAI PANITCHAPKDI, 
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MILLENNIUM 66 (2004); see also Cho, supra note 127, at 391–99. 
134. See generally Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability Means—and Does Not 
Mean, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 170, 170–78 (2009) (reviewing NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: 
POLITICS, PRINCIPLES & INNOVATIONS (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuiji eds., 2006)). For a 
discussion on the legitimacy of NGOs as participants in international investment 
arbitration, see Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment 
Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 73 (2003). 
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and a limited number of civilian staff to assist or advise the 
existing governmental structures. Recent peace-building or post-
conflict reconstruction missions have been the latest 
manifestation of an evolving approach towards situations 
presenting a (potential) threat to international peace and 
security. International administrations occupy a special place in 
this evolution. The cases of Kosovo and Timor-Leste are, to a 
certain extent, a culmination of this evolution, since the UN has 
taken over the entire administration of the territories in these 
post-conflict scenarios. 
Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(“NATO”) armed intervention in Kosovo in March 1999, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, establishing the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(“UNMIK”).135 Resolution 1244 called upon UNMIK to promote 
the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government 
in Kosovo; perform basic civilian administrative functions; 
support the reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil 
law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe return 
of all refugees and displaced persons.136 UNMIK’s authority 
included full legislative and executive power in the areas of 
responsibility laid out the resolution. A few months later, the 
Security Council authorized the establishment of the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (“UNTAET”).137 A 
popular consultation, conducted earlier among the Timorese, 
had revealed a clear wish on their part to begin a transition 
toward independence. In the transitional process, UNTAET was 
endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of 
Timor-Leste and was empowered to exercise all legislative and 
executive authority, including the administration of justice.138 
Essentially, the dual character of legitimacy under 
international administrations is the consequence of the 
functional duality of an international organization’s exercise of 
public authority. On the one hand, an international 
administration is a subsidiary organ of an international 
organization; on the other hand, it functions as the government 
 
135. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
136. Id. ¶ 11(a)–(k). 
137. S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). 
138. Id. 
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of a territorial entity. The acts of the international administration 
are thus both international acts of the international 
organizations and internal acts of the state. When such missions 
are looked at according to their first capacity, they will be tested 
through the legitimacy of exercise. When international 
administrations are essentially seen as surrogate national 
governments, the tendency is to concentrate on the legitimacy of 
origin as the appropriate method of assessing the legitimacy of 
the exercise of those functions. 
Even if the international community has been somewhat 
reluctant in the past to accept the UN’s capacity to take over 
territorial administration, one can easily assert that this 
controversy is actually at an end.139 Despite some contentions to 
the contrary,140 there are clear bases for the legal authority to 
exercise administrative functions in post-conflict situations.141 
Several articles of the UN Charter can be interpreted to 
authorize peace-building missions and international 
administrations, depending on whether or not the consent of the 
host state has been obtained. Article 39 of the UN Charter gives 
the Security Council the power to make recommendations to the 
parties concerned. Operations authorized under this article are, 
therefore, based not only on the Security Council’s 
recommendatory power, but also on the consent of the state 
concerned. Article 41 gives the Security Council the power to 
impose measures not involving the use of armed force. In theory, 
when the consent of the host state cannot be obtained for 
whatever reason, and if a situation presents a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, this article can also be 
considered an adequate legal basis to authorize such a mission. 
Of course, one might consider that in light of the expanded 
interpretation of what constitutes a “threat to international peace 
 
139. See Erika de Wet, The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and 
Its Member States in the Post Cold War Era: Legal Basis and Implications for National Law, 8 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 291, 306–40 (2004). 
140. See, e.g., Hollin K. Dickerson, Assumptions of Legitimacy and the Foundations of 
International Territorial Administration, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 144, 145 (2006). 
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and security,” the Security Council has a particular duty to act in 
good faith when making determinations in this respect.142 
If one takes a classical approach to the legitimacy of 
international organizations and their exercise of powers, the 
establishment of peace-building missions in conformity with the 
UN Charter would clearly be sufficient to render international 
administrations legitimate. The legitimacy of establishing 
international post-conflict administrations is then principally 
derived from the procedural and legal validity of the action 
taken, i.e., its conformity with the UN Charter and other rules of 
international law. However, such activity is also legitimate as a 
consequence of the general consent of member states to the 
power of the Security Council to deal with situations that can be 
categorized as a threat to international peace and security.143 This 
is because states delegate certain powers to the Security Council 
by being a party to the UN Charter, which grants the UN Security 
Council the authority to establish these types of missions. Despite 
some reluctance in legal literature to accept the expanding role 
of the Security Council and the expanding range of measures the 
Security Council adopts under its Chapter VII powers,144 it is 
important to note that UN member states have not objected to 
recent comprehensive peace-building mandates.145 But despite 
these relatively undisputed legal bases, the question has been 
raised whether, in light of the impact of such decisions, the 
consent of either the host state or host population should not 
form the legitimate basis for the exercise of such functions, since 
such a requirement would be placed onto a national government 
exercising such functions.146 
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The consent of the host state is not absolutely necessary 
when the Security Council acts under Chapter VII. When 
possible, however, the consent of the host state is often sought 
and obtained for intrusive reconstruction activities.147 One reason 
for this is that from a practical perspective, international 
administrations cannot adequately operate without the consent 
of the sovereign state. More importantly, however, the specific ad 
hoc consent of the host state plays an important function from 
the perspective of the legitimacy of international administrative 
missions. In addition to the legal basis for the creation of 
comprehensive peace-building missions by the Security Council, 
the consent of the host state can be sought to enhance the 
legitimacy of origin, from an institutional perspective, of the 
exercise of such intrusive powers on a state’s territory. The 
consent of the host state, in general, to the authority of the 
Security Council is then complemented by the specific consent of 
the state for a particular type of activity; the legitimacy of exercise 
is complemented by the legitimacy of origin. 
In the case of Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
explicitly consented to the deployment of both civil and military 
personnel.148 Nevertheless, consent was not absolutely necessary, 
as UNMIK was established under a Chapter VII resolution. In this 
particular case, a purely legal argument could explain why the 
Security Council sought the consent of Yugoslavia. The consent 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was crucial given the 
ambiguities concerning its membership in the UN, as both the 
Security Council149 and the General Assembly150 had clearly 
indicated that it could not automatically be seen as the successor 
to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal 
 
147. See, e.g., Letter from Dieter Kastrup, Permanent Rep. of Germany to the U.N., 
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Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th year, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/55, at 32 (June 10, 1999). 
148. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 147, ¶ 5. 
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232 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:190 
Republic was considered by the Secretariat to be the de facto 
successor to the Socialist Federal Republic.151 The consent of 
Yugoslavia not only legalized the deployment of the mission in its 
territory, but it also added the necessary legitimacy to the 
authorization of this international administrative mission by the 
Security Council. 
The case of UNTAET is also rather unusual in this respect, 
since Indonesia’s consent was sought in spite of the very doubtful 
character of Indonesian sovereignty over Timor-Leste.152 Timor-
Leste was formally still a non-self-governing territory at the time 
of the 1999 popular consultation that led to the establishment of 
an international administration. According to the principles 
applicable to non-self-governing territories,153 Portugal retained 
formal sovereignty over Timor-Leste. However, an agreement was 
concluded between Portugal and Indonesia to organize the 
referendum and the international administration in the event of 
a vote in favor of independence.154 But the consent of Indonesia 
in this case could by no means legitimate the creation of an 
international administration on the territory of Timor-Leste, and 
can perhaps be explained by pragmatism. On the other hand, 
the consent of Portugal, which formally had sovereignty over the 
territory, had also been obtained through the signature of the 
treaty with Indonesia to organize the referendum.155 
However, when the consent of the state is problematic, such 
as in Timor-Leste, the lack of consent from the host population is 
often advanced as the reason such intrusive operations lack 
legitimacy.156 The focus here thus shifts from international 
administrations as subsidiary organs of international 
organizations to international administrations as substitute 
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national governments by seeking to establish popular legitimacy 
of origin similar to that of national governments. From an 
international organization perspective, the legitimacy of these 
missions is clearly established, but international administrations 
will typically lack the necessary democratic legitimacy usually 
required for national governments. Indeed, popular consent has 
never been the basis for the establishment of the latest post-conflict 
administrations or peace-building missions. Even in Timor-Leste, 
when prior to the establishment of UNTAET a referendum had 
been organized, the only question put to the citizens was whether 
they agreed or not to independence. There was no explicit 
ambition to seek consent of the Timorese for the exercise of 
administrative powers by the UN, although the choice for an 
independent Timor-Leste implied the exercise of such powers by 
the organization. 
In the absence of popular legitimacy of origin, post-conflict 
international administrations have been somewhat forced to 
enhance the legitimacy of their exercise of legislative, executive, 
and even judicial powers through consultation with national 
authorities. This type of legitimacy, although incomplete when 
viewed from the standards for national governments set out 
above, in fact combines elements relating to the source of 
authority (legitimacy of origin) and elements relating to the 
legality and thus the legitimacy of the national level decision-
making process of international administrations in their 
government functions (legitimacy of exercise). Former UNTAET 
transitional administrator Vieira de Mello explained: 
The more powers conferred on local representatives, the 
closer power is to the people and thus the more legitimate 
the nature of the administration. But conferring power on 
non-elected local representatives can also have the undesired 
effect of furthering a particular party. The inclination of the 
U.N. is thus to be cautious about delegating power in the 
interest of avoiding furthering any particular political party. 
There is consultation, but all essential decision making and 
executive authority remains with the U.N.157 
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At the same time, the former transitional administrator 
questioned the appropriateness of such an approach.158 
In practice, consultation with local actors has been 
paramount to enhancing the legitimacy of such missions, and 
local institutions often have been created for this purpose. The 
Special Representative in Kosovo, upon his arrival, established a 
Kosovo Transitional Council (“KTC”) as a consultative, quasi-
legislative organ.159 A few months later it was expanded and 
integrated into the first Kosovar multi-ethnic governmental 
structure: the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (“JIAS”).160 
Soon after UNTAET’s arrival, the transitional administrator for 
East Timor established the National Consultative Council 
(“NCC”), a political body consisting of eleven Timorese and four 
UNTAET members, to oversee the decision making by the 
international administration.161 The Council’s primary 
responsibility was to make policy recommendations on significant 
executive and legislative matters, and to consult with the 
Timorese on all aspects of UNTAET’s involvement. Review of 
UNTAET regulations was included in the Council’s advisory 
mandate, and all UNTAET regulations adopted during the 
National Consultative Council’s tenure were endorsed by the 
Council.162 
This section has shown that, although the legitimacy of 
international organizations has been traditionally tested only 
from the perspective of the legitimacy of exercise, recent 
developments show a tendency towards assessing decision-making 
power within international organizations also through the lens of 
the legitimacy of origin. Of course, the dual character of 
legitimacy is most visible when international organizations take 
over administrative functions within a state, therefore effectively 
 
158. See id. 
159. Press Release, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
[UNMIK], UNMIK Convenes First Meeting of Kosovo Transitional Council; Recruitment 
of New Kosovo Police Service Launched; Confidence-Building Measures Agreed (July 16, 
1999), U.N. Press Release UNMIK/PR/12. 
160. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/1, On the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative 
Structure, § 1(c)–(d), U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/1 (Jan. 14, 2000).  
161. UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/2, On the Establishment of a National 
Consultative Council, §§ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/2 (Dec. 2, 1999). 
162. U.N. Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor: Rep. Of the Secretary-General, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/54/769 (Mar. 
7, 2000). 
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combining the two forms of legitimacy. In those cases, the 
decision-making process at the institutional level tends to be 
supported by both the legal validity of the decisions taken and 
the consent of the host state. During the performance of their 
missions, international administrations, although legitimate from 
an institutional perspective, typically will lack popular legitimacy 
of origin. In those circumstances, international post-conflict 
administrations have sought to legitimize their activity by 
consulting with local ad hoc authorities, which offers some form 
of legitimacy of origin in their decision-making power on the 
national level. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the complexity of global 
governance can hardly be disentangled if one fails to understand 
the dual nature of legitimacy of its main actors, i.e., governments 
and international organizations. It has been submitted that 
legitimacy should, for each of them, be gauged from the 
standpoint of both their origin and the way in which they exercise 
their powers. Such a distinction has been insufficiently taken into 
account in international legal scholarship. While emphasizing 
the need for a distinction between the legitimacy of origin and 
the legitimacy of exercise for both governments and 
international organizations, this Article has tried to demonstrate 
that each of these aspects of legitimacy has been given varying 
weight. In particular, it has been explained that, with respect to 
the legitimacy of governments, the emphasis classically put on 
the legitimacy of origin is no longer exclusive, and more 
attention is paid to the legitimacy of exercise. Recent practice 
and contemporary literature have shown that the question of the 
legitimacy of international organizations is no longer solely based 
on the way in which these organizations exercise their powers but 
also based on their origin. This Article ultimately expresses the 
hope that the conceptual clarifications that have been put 
forward here will be instrumental in stimulating more 
systematized research about legitimacy of global actors in the 
context of global governance. 
